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EQUILIBRIUM INVESTMENT IS REDUCED 
IF WE ALLOW FOR FORWARD CONTRACTS 
 





  In this paper we analyze incentives to invest in capacity prior to a 
sequence of Cournot spot markets with varying demand. We compare 
equilibrium investment in the absence and in presence of the possibility to trade 
on forward markets. We find that the possibility to trade forwards reduces 
equilibrium investments. 
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 1 Introduction
In the course of the liberalization of electricity markets one of the major
objectives has been the implementation of a market design that enhances
competition. In this context, the role of forward markets in mitigating market
power has been discussed extensively. The debate was initiated by Allaz
(1992) and Allaz and Vila (1993), who show that the strategic use of forward
markets enhances competition in a Cournot oligopoly. The literature on
electricity market design adopted this model, arguing that the introduction
of forward markets could decrease spot prices and thereby enhance e±ciency.1
In this debate, incentives to invest in capacity under di®erent market
designs have long been ignored. On several recent occasions, however, short-
ages of transmission and/or generation capacity provoked serious breakdowns
of electricity power supply. For example in California, wholesale electricity
prices during the Summer of 2000 were nearly 500% higher than they were
during the same months in 1998 or 1999. Some customers were required
to involuntarily curtail electricity consumption in response to supply short-
ages.2 In 2003, a great blackout in the United States and Canada knocked
out power to 50 million people over a 9,300-square-mile area stretching from
New England to Michigan.3 Those events demonstrated that the reliability
of energy provision | and thus, the general functioning of energy markets
| depends crucially on the existence of su±cient capacities at high levels
of demand. Consequently, investment incentives have to be considered when
evaluating the attractiveness of a market design. Moreover, a market design
that enhances competition in a model where capacity choices are not taken
into account, does not necessarily have the same e®ect when one accounts
for capacity choices upfront.
For both reasons, investment incentives recently have become a mayor
1See for example Newbery (1998) and Le Coq and Orzen (2002).
2See the discussion in Joskow (2001) and Borenstein (2002).
3CBSnews.com, August 15, 2003 at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/08/15/national/main568422.shtml
2topic in the debate on electricity market design. Investment prior to price
competition has been analyzed by von der Fehr and Harbord (1997).4 They
show that from a social welfare point of view, investments in generation ca-
pacity are too low, even if the spot market is perfectly competitive. Grimm
and Zoettl (2005) show the same for capacity choices prior to Cournot com-
petition at the spot markets. Murphy and Smeers (2003) analyze a capacity
expansion model where at the production stage players compete on a se-
quence of Cournot markets with varying demand. They show that capacities
are higher and prices are lower if capacity choices are observable prior to pro-
duction. In a follow{up paper, Murphy and Smeers (2004) show that if ¯rms
can choose their capacities prior to a single Cournot spot market, the intro-
duction of forward markets is ine®ective. In equilibrium, equal capacities are
chosen in the cases with and without forward trading. Hence, equilibrium
quantities are the same.5
In this paper, we analyze capacity investments prior to a continuum of
subsequent Cournot spot markets with di®erent demand realizations. We
compare the resulting two stage game to a market design where forwards
can be traded prior to each spot market. We ¯nd that capacity investments
generally decrease upon the introduction of forward markets.
Let us ¯nally mention the connection of our model with a broader liter-
ature on commitment devices in Cournot oligopoly. Note that forward con-
tracts as analyzed by Allaz and Vila have the same impact on the Cournot
outcome as the delegation of output decisions to managers or the delegation
of sales to retailers, as analyzed among others by Vickers (1985) and Fersht-
man and Judd (1987). In all those models, the (owner of the) ¯rm uses an
incentive scheme to commit the intermediary to a more aggressive behavior,
which in equilibrium leads to higher quantities and lower price. Our result
4Those authors do not analyze price setting behavior a la Bertrand but consider an auc-
tion like mechanism. Capacity choices prior to Bertrand competition have been analyzed
extensively following the contribution by Kreps and Scheinman (1983).
5This result has the same °avor as the well known result by Kreps and Scheinkman
(1983).
3applies to all those models: If capacity investments are an issue in the mar-
ket under consideration, we have to expect lower capacities if the ¯rms have
access to strategic devices.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we state the model. In
section 3 we analyze the game without forward contracts. Section 4 analyzes
the game in the presence of forward markets and compares the results of the
two scenarios. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We analyze a duopoly where ¯rms have to make a capacity choice before they
compete on a continuum of successive spot markets. Prior to production, but
after capacities have been chosen, they have the possibility to trade forward
contracts, by which they commit to sell a certain quantity on a speci¯c spot
market at a ¯xed price. The situation we have in mind is captured by the
following three stage game:
At stage one each ¯rm i, i = 1;2, invests in capacity xi 2 R+, i = 1;2, at
a unit cost k (¯rms are assumed to be symmetric with respect to their cost
of investment).
At stage two, having observed the capacity choices x = (xi;x¡i),6 for
each spot market t 2 [0;T] ¯rms have the possibility to sell any quantity up
to their capacity on the forward market at a ¯xed price. Forward contracts
f(t) = (fi(t);f¡i(t)) are sold in an arbitrage-free market.7
At stage three ¯rms face the capacity constraints inherited from stage one
and hold the forward positions from stage two. They simultaneously choose
outputs for each spot market t 2 [0;T], denoted by y(t) = (yi(t);y¡i(t)).
Demand at time t, P(Y;t), has the functional form8 P(Y;t) = at ¡ Y (t),
6We denote by ¡i the ¯rm other than i.
7Since we analyze the case of demand certainty we are interested in forward contracts
as a strategic device, as introduced by Allaz and Vila (1993).
8The majority of the contributions to the topic we analyze concentrate on the case of
linear demand. Examples are Fershtman and Judd (1987), Vickers (1985), Allaz and Vila
4where Y (t) = yi(t) + y¡i(t) is the aggregate quantity produced by the two
¯rms at time t, a ¸ 0, and t 2 [0;T].9 Both ¯rms have the same marginal cost
of production which is assumed to be constant. Without loss of generality
we normalize marginal cost to zero.
Firm i's pro¯t from operating in the time interval [0;T] if capacities and
forwards are given by x and f(t) and ¯rms have chosen feasible10 production




[at ¡ (yi(t) + y¡i(t))]yi(t)dt ¡ kxi: (1)
The game we consider is a three stage game with observability after each
stage. We look for subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies. The
assumption that spot market quantities for the entire interval [0;T] have to
be chosen simultaneously prior to t = 0 is made for expositional simplicity.
All results are still true if ¯rms can choose production schedules for the
subsequent time interval at ¯nitely many points within the time interval
[0;T].
3 Equilibrium without Forward Contracts
In this section we analyze the game without the possibility to trade forward
contracts. This is equivalent to exogenously ¯x forwards at f(t) = 0 for all t.
Thus, we have a two stage game where ¯rms invest at stage one and decide
upon quantities at stage two. We derive the subgame perfect equilibrium
of the game by backward induction, that is, we ¯rst solve for the equilibria
at stage two and then derive equilibrium capacity choices given that ¯rms
anticipate equilibrium play at stage two.
(1993), or Murphy and Smeers (2004).
9The demand realizations are ordered from low to high for tractability reasons. How-
ever, as it is easy to show, the result holds also for any other ordering of demand realiza-
tions.
10That is, fi(t) · yi(t) · xi for all t 2 [0;T], i = 1;2.
5Stage II First note that for given investment levels x we can solve the
maximization problem of ¯rm i pointwisely. That is, ¯rm i's pro¯t as given
by (1) is maximized whenever the integrand is maximized at each t 2 [0;T].11
Thus, an equilibrium y¤(x;t) satis¯es simultaneously for both ¯rms and for
each t 2 [0;T]
y
¤
i(x;t) 2 arg max
y
©£






s.t. 0 · y · xi:
The above considerations imply that an equilibrium of the game at stage
two, (y¤
i(x;t);y¤
¡i(x;t)), is given by the equilibrium outputs of the capacity
constrained Cournot games at each t 2 [0;T].
It is easy to show that the ¯rms' unconstrained reaction functions at time
t have the from ~ yBR
i (y¡i;t) =
at¡y¡i
2 and that the unconstrained Cournot
equilibrium is that both ¯rms produce ~ y¤
i(t) = at
3 , i = 1;2. Suppose now
that ¯rm i's investment is (weakly) lower than ¯rm ¡i's. Depending on how
much the ¯rms have invested at stage one relative to the demand realization
at time t, we have to distinguish three cases.
(CN) No ¯rm is constrained if xi ¸ ~ y¤
i(t) = at
3 , i = 1;2, i. e. each ¯rm's
unconstrained Cournot quantity is lower than its maximal possible out-
put given the capacity choices. Obviously, this is the case whenever
0 · t ·
3xi
a , i = 1;2. In this interval the equilibrium of the sec-






















; i = 1;2:
11Any function ^ y(t) that di®ers from y¤(t) at a ¯nite number of points also maximizes
¼. However, note that this does not a®ect the optimal investment.
6(Ci) Firm i is constrained if t >
3xi
a and therefore xi · at
3 . In this case
¯rm i cannot play its unconstrained Cournot output, but will produce
at capacity. As long as ¯rm ¡i is not yet constrained, it will play




This implies that ¯rm ¡i is unconstrained for all t ·
2x¡i+xi
a . Thus,




a ], in equilibrium the low-capacity ¯rm i produces at








































(CB) Both ¯rms are constrained for demand realizations higher than
t =
2x¡i+xi














i (x;t) = (at ¡ xi ¡ x¡i)xi; i = 1;2:
As we already mentioned in section 2 the results do not change if we allow
the ¯rms to choose production schedules at a ¯nite number of points in time.
This is obvious since due to uniqueness of the equilibrium at each t, only
playing y¤
i(x;t) satis¯es subgame perfection.
Figure 1 illustrates the results for a particular demand realization t.
Stage I For a given t, ¯gure 1 shows which type of equilibrium exists for
each given pair of investment levels, x. Building on these results we can now
7Figure 1: Nash equilibria at stage two of the market game without forward
contracts.
derive ¯rm i's pro¯t from investing xi, given that the other ¯rm invests x¡i
and quantity choices at stage two are given by y¤. A ¯rm's pro¯t from given
levels of investments, x, is the integral over equilibrium pro¯ts at each t given
x on the domain [0;T]. For each t, ¯rms anticipate equilibrium play at stage
two, which gives rise to one of the three types of equilibria, EQCN, EQCi,
or EQCB. Note that any x > 0 gives rise to the unconstrained equilibrium
if t is close enough to zero. An increase of t corresponds to a dilation of
all regions outwards with center zero. Thus, a pair of investment levels that
initially gave rise to an EQCN leads to an equilibrium where one ¯rm is
8constrained (either EQCi if x¡i > xi or EQC¡i if if xi > x¡i) for a higher
t. As t increases even more, x ¯nally is located in the region where both
¯rms are constrained (EQCB). For investment levels where both ¯rms are























i dt ¡ kxi (2)
=








for xi ¸ x¡i and xi ·
aT¡x¡i























i dt ¡ kxi (3)
=







for xi · x¡i and x¡i ·
aT¡xi
2 (denoted region D).




i , implying that the pro¯t
function ¼i(x;y¤) is continuous for all x. Given y¤(x;t) we can now derive
the equilibrium of stage one which yields the subgame perfect equilibrium of
the two stage game.
Proposition 1 The market game where ¯rms ¯rst invest in capacity and
then engage in quantity competition in a continuum of spot markets has a











; i = 1;2:
They produce the unconstrained Cournot best reply quantities at stage two
whenever this is possible, and at capacity otherwise.
Proof: see Appendix A.
12For investment levels where one ¯rm is unconstrained at the highest demand realiza-
tion the last integral has to be dropped and the upper limit of the second integral has to




in ¯gure 2). If both ¯rms are unconstrained at
the highest demand realization the two last integrals have to be dropped and the upper





9Figure 2: Best replies, equilibrium, and the isoinvestment line INF for the
market game without forward contracts.
Since the main objective of the paper is to compare the level of total
investment with and without forward markets, we de¯ne
I
NF = fx 2 R
2






The isoinvestment line INF contains all investment levels xi;x¡i leading to
the same total investment as the equilibrium of the the market game without
forward contracts we analyzed in this section. Best reply functions at stage
one and the isoinvestment line are depicted in ¯gure 2.
104 Equilibrium with Forward Contracts
If we include forward markets, we have to analyze the three stage game al-
ready described in section 2, where prior to production but after investments
have been made, forwards can be traded.
The impact of forward markets on Cournot competition has already been
analyzed by Allaz and Vila (1993). In section 4.1 we extend the analysis
to the presence of capacity constraints. In section 4.2 we will use the sub-
game perfect equilibria of the parameterized subgames starting at stage two
in order to characterize equilibrium investments at stage one (prior to a con-
tinuum of Cournot markets) and compare them to equilibrium investments
in the market game without forward markets.
4.1 Forward Trading in the Presence of Capacity Con-
straints
Stage III In each subgame starting at stage three, ¯rms have observed
investment levels x = (xi;x¡i) and the quantities traded forward, f(t) =
(fi(t);f¡i(t)). Again, ¯rm i's pro¯t as given by (1) is maximized whenever
the integrand is maximized at each t 2 [0;T]. Thus, an equilibrium of stage
three satis¯es simultaneously for both ¯rms and for each t 2 [0;T]13
y
¤
i(x;f;t) 2 arg max
y¸0
f(at ¡ y ¡ y
¤
¡i)(y ¡ fi(t))g s.t. fi(t) · y · xi: (5)
Note that y¤
i(t) only depends on the forwards traded for period t, f(t).
Now we solve for the equilibrium of stage three. As a ¯rst step we ignore





at + fi ¡ y¡i
2
; i = 1;2: (6)
13With a slight abuse of notation, we use the same symbols as in the case without
forward contracts.




at + 2fi ¡ f¡i
3
; i = 1;2:










; i = 1;2:
It is straightforward to show that for each (x;f;t) the equilibrium14
fy¤
i(x;f;t);y¤
¡i(x;f;t)g of stage three is unique. Depending on the values
of x, f, and t, none of the ¯rms, one of them, or both are capacity con-
strained in equilibrium. We now become speci¯c on equilibrium quantities
and pro¯t functions in each of those cases:
(CN) No ¯rm is constrained if for both ¯rms the unconstrained Cournot
quantities given f are lower than capacity. This holds true, whenever
xi > ~ y
¤
i(f;t); i = 1;2: (7)
We denote by F CN(x;t) the set of all f for which both inequalities in
(7) are satis¯ed at (x;t). For all f 2 F CN(x;t), equilibrium quantities
at stage three are y¤
i(x;f;t) = ~ y¤






(at ¡ fi ¡ f¡i)(at + 2fi ¡ f¡i)
9
: (8)
(Ci) Only ¯rm i is constrained if ¯rm i's unconstrained Cournot quan-
tity given f exceeds its capacity, but ¯rm ¡i is not constrained in
equilibrium. This holds true, whenever
xi · ~ y
¤
i(f;t) and x¡i ¸ ~ y
BR
¡i (xi;f;t): (9)
We denote by F Ci(x;t) the set of all f for which both inequalities
are satis¯ed at (x;t). For all f 2 F Ci(x;t), equilibrium quantities at
14Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
12stage three are y¤
i(x;f;t) = xi, y¤
¡i(x;f;t) = ~ yBR

















(CB) Both ¯rms are constrained if they cannot play their unconstrained
best reply given the other ¯rm produces at capacity. This holds true,
whenever
xi · ~ y
BR
i (x¡i;f;t); i = 1;2:
We denote by F CB(x;t) the set of all f for which both inequalities are
satis¯ed at (x;t). For all f 2 F CB(x;t), equilibrium quantities at stage
three are y¤




¤;t) = (at ¡ xi ¡ x¡i)xi; i = 1;2: (12)
Stage II Now we derive all subgame perfect equilibria of the parameterized
subgames starting at stage two. Again, given investment levels and equilib-
rium play at stage three, we can solve pointwisely for the equilibria at stage
two for each t 2 [0;T].
It is important to notice that uniqueness of the equilibrium
at stage three implies that for each investment level x, the sets
F CB(x;t);F Ci(x;t);F C¡i(x;t), and F CN(x;t) partition the set F = [0;xi] £
[0;x¡i] of all feasible levels of forward trades given x. For each set, we can
now characterize the subgame perfect equilibria (f¤;y¤). Within each set,
any equilibrium leads to unique quantities y¤ at stage three, that may, how-
ever, be supported by various quantities of forward contracts traded at stage
two. Lemmas 1 to 3 state the equilibrium quantities, as well as the values
of x for which an equilibrium exists in the di®erent regions. The proofs are
relegated to appendix B.
Lemma 1 (No ¯rm is constrained)
13(i) If f¤(x;t) 2 F CN(x;t), then y¤
i(f¤(x;t);x;t) = 2at
5 , i = 1;2 (denoted
EQCN).15
(ii) EQCN exists, if and only if xi ¸ (1 ¡ 2
p
2
5 )at =: at
c2:3 ¼ at
2:3, i = 1;2.
Lemma 2 (One ¯rm is constrained)
(i) If f¤(x;t) 2 F Ci(x;t), then y¤





(ii) EQCi exists if and only if xi < at
2 and x¡i ¸ at¡xi
2 .
Lemma 3 (Both ¯rms are constrained)
(i) If f¤(x;t) 2 F CB(x;t), then y¤
i(f¤(x;t);x;t) = xi, i = 1;2 (denoted
EQCB).
(ii) EQCB exists if and only if xi ·
at¡x¡i
2 , i = 1;2.
Lemmas 1 to 3 enable us to determine which of the four possible equilibria
exist for each given investment levels x. Note for example that for high
investment levels (xi ¸ at
c2:3, i = 1;2), the unconstrained equilibrium exists
(lemma 1). However, if investments of bidder i are in that region but low
enough ( at
c2:3 · xi · at
2 ), also EQCi exists (lemma 2). Thus, for all xi 2
[at
2 ; at
c2:3] both equilibria exist, provided x¡i is high enough.
Figure 3 summarizes the results of lemmas 1 to 3. The ¯gure shows
(given a particular demand realization t) for each possible combination of
investment levels, which of the four possible types of equilibria exist.
In order to analyze all subgame perfect equilibria of the game it is nec-
essary to determine the pro¯t functions for all di®erent choices of equilibria
at stages two and three. This, however, seems to be impossible since, in re-
gions with multiple equilibria, for each t another equilibrium of the subgame
starting at stage two can be chosen. Moreover, the selection of equilibria of
15That is, any equilibrium in the unbounded region yields the solution found by Allaz
and Vila (1993).
14Figure 3: Subgame perfect equilibria of the parameterized subgames starting
at stage two.
the continuation game may depend on the history of the game, that is, on x.
Let us de¯ne
Definition 1 (¾-subgame perfect equilibrium, SPE(¾)) A ¾-sub-
game perfect equilibrium is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the three stage
game where in every small interval [t;t+±], ± ! 0, the equilibrium preferred
by ¯rm i has share ¾ and the equilibrium preferred by ¯rm ¡i has share
1 ¡ ¾.
In the following we consider only the SPE(¾) of the market game with
15forward contracts. This excludes any equilibrium where the choice of equi-
libria at stages two and three depends on choices of x, or on t. We make this
restriction mainly for tractability reasons. However, with the parametriza-
tion chosen it should be possible to approximate a huge variety of plausible
operational markets. Let us give two examples for equilibria that are cov-
ered by this formulation: (1) The equilibrium preferred by one of the ¯rms is
always played (e.g. because that ¯rm has the commitment power to enforce
this). (2) The equilibrium is chosen randomly with probabilities ¾, 1 ¡ ¾ at
each t where multiple equilibria exist.
As we mentioned in section 2, we do not need the assumption that ¯rms
decide on y(t) prior to t = 0. We can also allow for the choice of production
schedules prior to a ¯nite number of time intervals. Note that the spot market
equilibrium y¤(x;f;t) is unique for all t and thus, is the only equilibrium play
satisfying subgame perfection if production schedules are chosen repeatedly
(but forwards for all t are chosen prior to t = 0). In general this does not hold
true for the choice of forward quantities. Here multiplicity of equilibria leaves
scope for credible threats that may support outcomes other than f¤;y¤ for
some t 2 [0;T]. However, the ¾-subgame perfect equilibria we consider in the
following do not allow for conditioning on past equilibrium outcomes. Thus,
all equilibria covered by this concept are also equilibria of the game where
forwards are chosen repeatedly prior to a ¯nite number of time intervals.16
4.2 Equilibrium Investments
Stage I Now that we have determined the equilibria of the subgames start-
ing at stage two for all possible capacities, we can turn towards solving the
subgame perfect equilibria of the market game with forward contracts. Fig-
ure 3 depicts the areas of existence of the di®erent types of equilibria for a
16Finally note that conditioning on past outcomes does not make sense in the present
model since demand realizations are ordered. Thus, the evolution of the game over time
is meaningless. The model would have to be substantially modi¯ed in order to analyze
those issues.
16given value of t. A ¯rm's pro¯t from given levels of investments, x, is the
integral over equilibrium pro¯ts at each t given x on the domain [0;T].
Note that (as in the case without forwards) any x > 0 gives rise to
the unconstrained equilibrium if t is close enough to zero. An increase of t
corresponds to a dilation of all regions outwards with center zero. Observe
furthermore that in the three slices L, M, and R (see ¯gure 3), di®erent
types of equilibria exist and that also their sequence is di®erent. Thus, the
exact form of the pro¯t function depends on the location of the investment
levels x.
Suppose for example that we want to determine bidder i's pro¯t
¼i(x;f¤;y¤) from a given pair of investment levels x, where xi > 2x¡i. That
is, we have to integrate parameterized equilibrium pro¯ts of the subgames
starting at stage two from t = 0 to t = T given that x is located in region
L (see ¯gure 3). In case both ¯rms are constrained at the highest demand





























Starting from t = 0, any x > 0 lies in the region where only EQCN exists.
Thus, the relevant pro¯t for low values of t is ¼CN(x;f¤;y¤;t) as given by
equation (8). That region is left when x¡i = at
2 (see ¯gure 3), or equivalently,
t =
2x¡i
a . This explains the upper limit of the ¯rst integral.
As t becomes larger than
2x¡i
a we enter into a region where multiple
equilibria (of type EQCN and EQC¡i) exist. Obviously, di®erent selections
of equilibria of the continuation games played at each t in such a region
yield di®erent equilibrium capacity choices at stage one. The parameter ¾
determines which of the equilibria of the subgame starting at stage two is
selected at the operating stages. Firm i prefers EQCN and thus, receives
share ¾ of the corresponding pro¯t ¼CN
i . The other ¯rm prefers EQC¡i
17which is why ¯rm i receives share 1 ¡ ¾ of the corresponding pro¯t ¼
C¡i
i .
As t increases beyond
c2:3x¡i
a , ¯rst only EQC¡i exists and ¯nally, for high
values of t, both ¯rms are constrained, i. e. they play EQCB. This explains
the fourth and ¯fth integral of equation (13).17
Note that in the remaining regions, M and R the pro¯t function looks
di®erent since the sequence of the areas of existence of the di®erent types
of equilibria is di®erent (see ¯gure 3). In appendix C we derive the pro¯t
functions for all three regions. We obtain a parameterized pro¯t function
¼i(x;f¤;y¤;¾) that is continuous at all x, but not everywhere di®erentiable.
From this pro¯t function we derive a continuous but not everywhere di®er-
entiable upper bound for ¯rm i's best reply function ¹ xBR
i (x¡i;f¤;y¤;¾).
Now we can compare investment levels in the two market games (with
and without forward trading) by comparing ¹ xBR
i (x¡i;f¤;y¤;¾) with the isoin-
vestment line INF in the market without forward contracts de¯ned by equa-
tion (4). If the best reply function lies below the isoinvestment line for all
xi ¸ x¡i, no equilibrium of the game with forward contracts can yield higher
total investment than the game without forward contracts. The result is
summarized in the following
Lemma 4 The best reply function of ¯rm i at stage one, xBR
i (x¡i;f¤;y¤;¾),
yields xBR
i (x¡i) + x¡i < xj + x¡j for all (xj;x¡j) 2 INF whenever
xBR
i (x¡i;f¤;y¤;¾) ¸ x¡i.
For a detailed proof see appendix C.
Figure 4 illustrates the lemma. It depicts the isoinvestment line INF in
the case without forward markets, as well as (in the region above the 45-
degree line) the upper bound of ¯rm i's best reply in the presence of forward
markets, ¹ xBR
i (x¡i;f¤;y¤;¾). As the latter always lies below the isoinvestment
line in absence of forward trading, we can conclude:
17Capacity choices in region L (see ¯gure 4)lead to a situation where both ¯rms are
constrained at the highest demand realization. This is the case described here. For
investment levels in region L, x is never inside the region CB, such that the last integral
(or the two or four last integrals) have to be dropped. See also footnote 10.
18Figure 4: The upper bound of ¯rm i's best reply function, xBR
i (x¡i;f¤;y¤;¾),
and the isoinvestment line INF.
Theorem 1 Every SPE(¾) of the market game with forward contracts gives
rise to strictly less total investment than the unique equilibrium of the game
without forward contracts.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we analyzed a market game where ¯rms choose capacities prior
to a sequence of Cournot markets. We compared the game with and without
the possibility to trade on forward markets prior to the production stages.
19The analysis was considerably complicated by the fact that multiple equilibria
exist in the market game with forward contracts. In order to be able to
compare equilibrium investments with and without the possibility to trade
forwards, we considered a class of parameterized subgame perfect equilibria
of the game, SPE(¾). This allowed us to approximate many reasonable
operational markets in the case that forward contracts can be traded. We
found that every SPE(¾) of the market game with forward contracts yields
lower equilibrium investment than the game without forward contracts.
This result contributes to an ongoing policy debate on the desirability of
forward trading in electricity markets. We have shown in a companion paper
[Grimm and Zoettl (2005)] that equilibrium capacity choices of ¯rms prior to
Cournot competition are too low both, compared to the socially optimal level
(assuming that also quantities at the production stage are chosen optimally)
and to the optimal capacity levels given Cournot quantities are chosen at the
production stage. Thus, a further reduction of capacities due to the intro-
duction of forward markets puts into question the welfare increasing e®ect
of forward markets due to lower spot prices. On the one hand, with forward
trading production will be higher and prices will be lower in low demand
scenarios when ¯rms are unconstrained. In high demand scenarios, however,
production is lower (and prices are higher) in the presence of forward mar-
kets since capacities are lower. A welfare comparison is a possible extension
of this paper but will be complicated by the multiplicity of equilibria of the
market game with forward contracts.
Apart from the welfare e®ect as it could be calculated from our model, low
generation (and transmission) capacities often put the general functioning of
energy markets at risk. Thus, capacity investment incentives under a certain
market design are an important issue by themselves. In many countries, a
further reduction of generation capacity is considered undesirable in the long
run.
The model we propose could be reinterpreted in terms of demand uncer-
tainty. In this case the model also covers the case of investment decisions
20prior to a single Cournot market with uncertain demand at the last stage.18
In this interpretation, the real state of the world is revealed directly after
the investment decision. Forward contracts and quantities are traded under
complete information about the demand scenario. An interesting extension
of this model is the case where on the spot market ¯rms still face demand
uncertainty. This, however, would imply supply function bidding (Klemperer
and Meyer (1989)) at the last stage, which presumably further complicates
the analysis.
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A Proof of Proposition 1.
In section 3 we have already analyzed the last stage of the game, where ¯rms
decide on production levels. At the ¯rst stage, ¯rms choose capacities, an-
ticipating optimal production decisions at the second stage. In the following
we ¯rst derive the ¯rms' best response functions at stage one (part I), Then
(part II) we solve the equilibrium of the game and show uniqueness.
Part I First we determine the best response function of ¯rm i.
(a) Region U = fx 2 R2
+ : xi ¸ x¡i andxi ·
aT¡x¡i
2 g: In this region ¯rm
i has the higher capacity and both ¯rms are capacity constrained at the
22highest possible demand realization. The ¯rst order condition of ¯rm i's

















2 is the local maximum and xmin
i the local
minimum.
As ¯rm i increases its quantity, the upper bound
aT¡x¡i
2 is reached before
the pro¯t function attains its local minimum at xmin
i . Since the (cubic) func-
tion ¼h
i increases towards 1 only for values of xi above this local minimum,
we obtain that ¼
U









for 0 · x¡i · x
U¡out





3 is the value of x¡i where
x
U
i (x¡i) hits the righthandside border of region U (given by xi = x¡i, see
¯gure 2).
Region D = fx 2 R2
+ : xi · x¡i andxi · aT ¡2x¡ig. In this region ¯rm i has
the higher capacity and both ¯rms are constrained at the highest demand
realization, i. e. x¡i ·
aT¡xi
2 . Firm i's pro¯t function in this case is given by
equation (3). By the same reasoning as above we obtain for the maximum
of ¼D in region D
x
D
i (x¡i) = max
(
0;
2aT ¡ 2x¡i ¡
p







¡i · x¡i · x
D¡out
















i ) is the value of x¡i where
x
D
i (x¡i) hits the lefthandside (righthandside) border of region D given by
xi = x¡i and x¡i =
aT¡xi
2 , respectively (see ¯gure 2).
Region D
I
= fx 2 R2
+ : xi ¸ aT ¡ 2x¡i andxi · aT
3 g: We ¯nally consider
the case that ¯rm i has the higher capacity and ¯rm ¡i always has excess
23capacity even at the highest demand realization, whereas ¯rm i is constrained
at least in the highest demand scenario .
In this region, the pro¯t of ¯rm i is given by equation (3), however, EQCB




a > T, we
have to drop the last integral and substitute the upper limit of the second



















xi dt ¡ kxi
=
xi(a2T2 + x2













i (x¡i) = maxf0;
2aT ¡
p













6 g is the intersection
point of xD
I
i (x¡i) and the lefthandside border of region D
I
.
Remark 1 For k ¸ aT2
4 it is always optimal for both ¯rms to choose capac-
ities such that at the highest demand realization T we obtain a spot market
equilibrium where both ¯rms are constrained. On the contrary for k · aT2
4 ,
whenever x¡i is big enough, no matter how big the capacity installed by ¯rm




(b) It is important to notice that the equations (14), (15) and (16) form
a continuous line. Also recall that the overall pro¯t function is continuous.
Thus, the continuous function given by equations (14), (15), and (16) deter-
mines the pro¯t maximizing capacity choices over all three regions









2 for 0 · x¡i · aT
3
xi · aT




19Again the the ¯rst order condition is satis¯ed at the local maximum and the local
minumum. Since we reach the upper bound of region D
I
however before the local minimum
is reached the solution to the ¯rst order condition gives the global maximum in region D
I
.
24(c) It remains to show that deviations outside the region U [D[D
I
are not
pro¯table for ¯rm i, i. e. that equations (14), (15), and (16) determine the
locus of arg maxxi¸0 ¼i(xi;x¡i).
We have to distinguish three di®erent cases:
(I) Region U
I
= fx 2 R2
+ : x¡i · aT
3 and xi >
aT¡x¡i
2 g: The pro¯t of ¯rm



















dt ¡ kxi (18)
¼U
I
i (x;y¤) is a linear function in xi and attains its maximum at the
lowest possible value, making a deviation into this region undesirable.
(II) Region U
II
= fx 2 R2
+ : x¡i ¸ aT
3 and xi > x¡ig: The pro¯t of
¯rm i is given by equation (2), dropping its last two integrals. This
pro¯t depends on xi only through the term ¡kxi. Thus, it attains its




= fx 2 R2
+ : xi ¸ aT
3 and xi < x¡ig: The pro¯t of ¯rm
i is given by equation (3), dropping its last two integrals. The pro¯t
depends on xi only through the term ¡kxi. Thus, the function attains
its maximum at the lowest possible value of xi, making a deviation into
this region undesirable.















i (x¡i) for aT¡
p
2ak











6 g · x¡i
(19)
for the parameter values a > 0, T > 0, and k 2 [0; aT2
2 ].20
20Investment in the market is pro¯table only if k < aT
2
2 . At higher cost it would not
even be pro¯table to invest for a monopolist (x¡i = 0).
25Part II Now we can determine all equilibria (x¤
i;x¤
¡i) of the market game
without forward contracts. We assume without loss of generality that xi ¸
x¡i. (x¤
i;x¤
¡i) is an equilibrium if and only if (x¤
i;x¤
¡i) is a ¯xed point of the
best reply correspondence, i. e. it satis¯es the following two equations:
xi =




, x¡i = aT ¡ 2xi ¡
p




2aT ¡ 2xi ¡
p





At xi = x¡i = aT¡
p
2ak
3 both equations are satis¯ed and thus, we have a
symmetric equilibrium. For xi > x¡i however, g(xi) decreases with slope ¡2,



















for all xi such that h(xi) > 0 and remains constant otherwise. Thus, for






; i = 1;2
is the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of the market game without for-
ward contracts. The result is illustrated in ¯gure 2.
B Proofs of lemmas 1 to 3
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1:
Part I We ¯rst show that any equilibrium EQCN, if it exists, is given by
f¤
i (¢) = 1
5at; y¤
i(¢) = 2
5at, i = 1;2.
Suppose that ( ¸ f¤; ¸ y¤) is an equilibrium and that ¸ f¤ 2 F CN(x;t). Thus,
we know from section 4.1 that at the third stage we have the unique solution
¸ y¤
i(x; ¸ f¤;t) =
at+2 ¸ f¤
i ¡ ¸ f¤
¡i
3 , i = 1;2. Since F CN(x;t) is an open set, ¸ f¤
i is a
maximizer of ¼i(x;fi; ¸ f¤
¡i; ¸ y¤;t) in some neighborhood of ¸ f¤
i .
26Since the pro¯t function of the game without capacity constraints
¼1
i (f; ¸ y¤;t) = ¼i(xi = 1;x¡i = 1;f; ¸ y¤;t) is concave in fi (compare equa-
tion (8) and Allaz and Vila (1993)), ¸ f¤
i is also the global maximizer for all
fi ¸ 0. Consequently, ( ¸ f¤; ¸ y¤) is the unique equilibrium of the unrestricted






Part II Conditions for existence of the equilibrium f¤









5at) 2 F NC(x;t) if and only if xi > 2
5at,
i = 1;2.
(b) However, depending on the capacity choices at stage one, fi = 1
5at might
not be the pro¯t maximizing choice of ¯rm i given that ¯rm ¡i chooses
f¡i = 1
5at. Recall that for fi = 1
5at, i = 1;2, none of the ¯rms is constrained
at the production stage. Now observe that, given that ¯rm ¡i chooses f¡i =
1
5at, by varying the number of forward contracts traded, ¯rm i can provoke
a situation where either of the two ¯rms is constrained. The corresponding













4 for 0· fi ·7
















5at· fi ·xi (FCi)
Note that the above pro¯ts correspond to the pro¯ts that have been
derived in section 4.1 for the cases CN (no ¯rm is constrained) and Ci, C¡i
(¯rm i/¡i is constrained). Furthermore note that if condition (a), xi ¸ 2
5at,
i = 1;2, is satis¯ed, the region where none of the ¯rms is constrained cannot
disappear. That is, given that ¯rm ¡i chooses f¡i = 1
5at, ¯rm i can always
sell forwards such that both ¯rms are unconstrained at stage three.






3 , i = 1;2, imply that if ¯rm i trades less forwards,
its quantity sold at stage three decreases, whereas the quantity sold by ¯rm
¡i increases. Thus, if ¯rm ¡i's capacity is su±ciently low, a low quantity of
forwards traded by ¯rm i can provoke a situation where ¯rm ¡i is capacity
27constrained at stage three. This happens if ¯rm ¡i's capacity x¡i is lower






equation (9)). Solving for the corresponding value of fi yields fi · 7
5at¡3x¡i.
Thus, for fi 2 [0; 7
5at ¡ 3x¡i], (fi;f¤
¡i) 2 F C¡i(x;t). Obviously, ¯rm i can
only provoke this situation if x¡i is low enough, i. e. x¡i 2 [2
5at; 7
15at].
A similar reasoning explains the case that (fi;f¤
¡i) 2 F Ci(x;t). Obviously,
this case can only occur if ¯rm i's capacity is low enough, i. e. xi · 4
5at.
It is easy to check that the above pro¯t function ¼i is continuous. Thus,
since ¼Ci
i is a constant, deviation upwards, fi > f¤
i , is never pro¯table.
Furthermore, ¼i has two local maxima, one at f¤
i = 1
5at and another one
at f0
i = 0. Obviously f¤ is an equilibrium if and only if f¤
i is the global
maximum of ¼i(fi;f¤


































We conclude that (f¤
i (¢) = 1
5at;y¤
i(¢) = 2
5at), i = 1;2, is a SPE of the param-
eterized subgames starting at stage two if and only if xi ¸ at
c2:3, i = 1;2.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 2:
Part I If there exists an equilibrium (f¤;y¤) such that f¤ 2 F Ci(x;t), then
by construction it holds that y¤










which is maximized at f¤
¡i = 0. Thus, in any equilibrium EQCi it holds that
f¤





2 . This proves part (i) of the lemma.
Part II Let f¤
i = xi, f¤
¡i = 0, and f0





¡i) 2 F Ci(x;t), is an equilibrium EQCi, then also (f¤;y¤),
21see equation 11.
28f¤ 2 F Ci(x;t), is an equilibrium EQCi.
We have already shown in part I that, given ¯rm i produces at capacity,
¯rm ¡i always chooses f¤
¡i = 0.
Now consider deviations of ¯rm i. Since (f0
i;f¤
¡i;y¤) is an equilibrium,
deviations fi 6= f0
i cannot be pro¯table. In particular, deviations fi 2 (f0
i;xi]
leave ¯rm i's payo® unchanged, since increasing the quantity contracted for-
ward leaves ¯rm i constrained at stage three.




¡i) 2 F Ci(x;t), is an equi-
librium EQCi, then so is (f¤
i ;f¤
¡i;y¤).
Part III The ¯ndings of part I and II imply that whenever at least one
equilibrium EQCi of the parameterized subgames starting at stage two exists,
(f¤
i ;f¤
¡i;y¤) = (xi;0;y¤) is an equilibrium EQCi (part II) and that all such
equilibria give rise to the same quantities at the production stage (part I).
We now establish necessary and su±cient conditions for the existence of at
least one equilibrium EQCi.
(a) First, we check whether (f¤
i ;f¤
¡i) = (xi;0) 2 F Ci(x;t). In order to do
so, we substitute (f¤
i ;f¤
¡i) = (xi;0) into the inequalities (9). As it turns
out, f¤ 2 F Ci(x;t) whenever it holds that




In order to establish that (f¤;y¤) is indeed an equilibrium it remains
to show that none of the ¯rms wants to deviate from its quantity of
forwards sold given the other ¯rm's choice.
(b) Let us ¯rst consider deviations of ¯rm ¡i. Since f¤
¡i = 0, only deviation
upwards is possible. Note that since fi = xi ¯rm i is committed to sell
its whole capacity at stage three (yi = xi) and as we have already
shown in part I, the best ¯rm ¡i can do is to stick to f¤
¡i = 0.
(c) Now we consider deviations of ¯rm i. Since f¤
i = xi, only deviation
29downwards is possible, which can lead to (fi;f¤
¡i) 2 F CN.22 Given that
f¤












9 for 0· fi ·3xi¡at
2 (FCN)
It is easy to check that ¼i is continuous at fi =
3xi¡at
2 . Furthermore note
that ¼Ci
i (fi;f¤
¡i) is a constant and ¼CN
i (fi;f¤
¡i) is a quadratic function
reaching its maximum at fi = at
4 . This implies that a deviation of ¯rm














2 ), i = 1;2, is a SPE
of the parameterized subgames starting at stage two if and only if x¡i ¸
at¡xi
2
[from (a)] and xi < at
2 [from (c)].
B.3 Proof of Lemma 3:
Part (i) is satis¯ed by construction since f¤ 2 F CB(x;t). In order to prove
part (ii), take any ¸ fi > 0, ¸ f¡i > 0 such that ( ¸ fi; ¸ f¡i) 2 F CB(x;t).
Given ¸ f¡i, ¯rm i's pro¯t function ¼i(fi; ¸ f¡i;¢) is23









4 for 0 · fi · 2xi + x¡i ¡ at (FC¡i)
¼CB
i (¢) = (at ¡ xi ¡ x¡i)xi for 2xi + x¡i ¡ at · fi · xi (FCB)
Notice that ¼i is continuous at fi = 2xi+x¡i¡at and that ¼CB
i is constant
in fi. It is easy to see that deviation to fi = 0 is always pro¯table for ¯rm
i whenever it leads to (fi = 0; ¸ f¡i) 2 F C¡i. Such a deviation is impossible
22Note that for x1 · 1
3at (which is the unconstrained Cournot quantity) deviation into
FCN is impossible.
23Notice if ¯rm i reduces fi such that (fi; ¸ f¡i) exits FCB, then for all values of fi ¯rm ¡i
will remain constrained, since ¯rm ¡i has even stronger incentives to increase it's output
at stage three.
30however if 2xi + x¡i ¡ at · 0. Accordingly ( ¸ fi; ¸ f¡i) is an equilibrium if and
only if
2xi + x¡i ¡ at · 0 , xi ·
at ¡ x¡i
2
; i = 1;2:
C Proof lemma 4
The proof proceeds as follows. In part I we consider the set of investment
levels where xi ¸ x¡i and both ¯rms are constrained at the highest demand
realization. Within this set we derive the investment level xi of ¯rm i that
maximizes ¯rm i's pro¯t given an investment level x¡i of ¯rm ¡i. In part
II we show that the function derived in part I is an upper bound for the
best response of ¯rm i to a given investment level of ¯rm ¡i. Finally, in
part III we show that the upper bound of ¯rm i's best response always lies
below the isoinvestment line (equation(4)) that contains all investment levels
that yield the same total capacity as the market game in absence forward
markets. Throughout the proof we consider only investment levels such that
xi ¸ x¡i, since this is su±cient to prove the lemma.
Part I As a ¯rst step, we consider the region where ¯rm i's investment is
higher than ¯rm ¡i's and both ¯rms are constrained at the highest demand
realization, that is xi(x¡i) 2 U = fx 2 R2
+ : xi ¸ x¡i andxi ·
aT¡x¡i
2 g.
Within this region, we derive the investment level xi of ¯rm i that maximizes
¯rm i's pro¯t given an investment level x¡i of ¯rm ¡i. We have to proceed
in three steps, since ¯rm i's pro¯t function looks di®erently in the three
subregions L, M, and R (see ¯gure 3).
Region L = fx 2 R2
+ : xi ¸ 2x¡i andxi ·
aT¡x¡i
2 g: Firm i's pro¯t
function ¼
L
i (x;f¤;y¤;¾) is given by equation (13). Note that di®erentiation of
¼
L
i (¢) leads to the same ¯rst order condition as di®erentiation of ¼
U
i (equation
(2)) in the case without forward contracts (see appendix A). This is because
all terms depending on xi coincide for the two pro¯t functions. Thus, ¼
L
i (¢)









for 0 · x¡i · x
L¡out





2ak) is the value of x¡i
where x
L
i (x¡i) intersects with the righthandside border of region L, given by
xi = 2x¡i.




i is decreasing in xi since the local minimum
is located above the upper bound of region L given by xi =
aT¡x¡i
2 . Thus,
for x¡i > x
L¡out
¡i , the maximizer x
L
i in region L is given by its lower bound
x
L
i (x¡i) = 2x¡i.
Region M = fx 2 R2
+ : 2x¡i ¸ xi ¸
c2:3
2 x¡i and xi ·
aT¡x¡i
2 g: The















































































where Á(x¡i;¾;k) = 2ak + 1
2¾
¡









Starting at xi = 0, for a given x¡i, ¼
M





i (x¡i), and from there on increases to in¯nity. Thus,
x
Mmax
i is the maximizer of ¼
M







i 2 M, whereas x
Mmin
i lies outside that region (in this case, ¼
M
i is
quasiconcave in region M). Unfortunately, this is not always the case. We
24The pro¯t in region M is derived analogously to the pro¯t in region L, see equation
(13).






i by characterizing the case where
the above holds true.



























For values x¡i · xS
¡i, ¼
M
i is monotonically increasing in xi with a point of
in°ection at xS
i . Thus, if xS 2 M, the maximizer of ¼
M
i coincides with the
upper bound of region M for x¡i · xS




might be inside region M such that ¼
M
i is not even quasiconcave in region M.
As it turns out, whether xS is in region M depends on the cost of investment,
k. Furthermore, x
Mmin
i is outside region M whenever xS is outside region
M.
Let us ¯rst determine the value of k for which xS coincides with the
lefthandside border of region two. Calculating the point of intersection
of xS with the lefthandside border given by xi = 2x¡i and inserting the
value obtained for x¡i into Á(x¡i;¾;k) yields that Á = 0 at k = kS :=
8¾+9¾2
2(20+3¾)2aT 2. Since kS is increasing in ¾, xS lies outside region M for all ¾ if
k ¸ 17
2(23)2aT 2 := aT2
c62 ¼ aT2
62 .
We now show that ¼
M
i is quasiconcave in xi in region M for all ¾ 2 [0;1]
if k 2 [aT2
c62 ; aT2
2 ].25 This is the case if x
Mmin
i (x¡i) is above region M for all
x¡i. In order to verify this, notice that x
Mmin
i (x¡i) crosses the lefthandside

















This is above the upper bound of region M given by xi =
aT¡x¡i
2 , which
intersects the line xi = 2x¡i at x¡i = aT
5 . Since x
Mmin
i increases in x¡i and
since the upper bound of region M, xi =
aT¡x¡i
2 , decreases in x¡i, we obtain
that x
Mmin
i is always above region M for ¾ 2 [0;1] and for k 2 [aT2
c62 ; aT2
2 ].
25Recall that at cost k > aT
2
2 even a potential monopolist would not enter the market.
33Thus, for k 2 [aT2
c62 ; aT2
2 ] the maximum of ¼
M






































2ak + 0:056a¾(aT 2 ¡ 2k)
(1 + c2:3) ¡ 0:18¾
;
are the values of x¡i where x
M
i intersects with the lefthandside and









¡i . Since ¼
M
i is quasiconcave in region M, the values of xi that maximize
¼
M
i for x¡i < x
M¡in
¡i are given by the lefthandside border of region M.
For k 2 [0; aT2








might be inside region M, which makes corner solutions possible. Lemma 4
can also be shown to hold true for k 2 [0; aT2
c62 ]. However, the proof requires a
much heavier mathematical burden and is therefore be abandoned to a sup-
plement that can be downloaded at http://merlin.fae.ua.es/grimm/grimm-
publications.html.
Region R = fx 2 R2
+ :
c2:3
2 x¡i ¸ xi ¸ x¡i andxi ·
aT¡x¡i
2 g: The pro¯t of











































































where Ã(x¡i;¾;k) = 2ak + ¾
50(¡18ak + 9a2T 2 + 7aTx1 ¡ (91 ¡ 133¾
8 )x2
1).
Similar to the analysis of region L, we can show that we always reach the
upper bound of region R, xi =
aT¡x¡i






Thus, in region R, ¼
R





























2ak + 0:056a¾(aT 2 ¡ 2k)








450a¾(aT 2 ¡ 2ak)
3 ¡ 11
150¾
are the values of x¡i where x
R
i intersects with the lefthandside and righthand-
side border of region R given by
c2:3x¡i






Summing up we can now state the maximizer over all three regions. Since
¼i is continuous at all x, we obtain that the maximizer x
L[M[R
i (x¡i) of ¼i in
the Region L [ M [ R = fx 2 R2
+ : xi ¸ x¡i andxi · (
aT¡x¡i)





> > > > <
> > > > :
x
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i (x¡i) for x
M¡in





i (x¡i) for x
R¡in
























increasing in x¡i, whereas the upper limit of Region R is decreasing in x¡i.
35Part II In order to establish that x
L[M[R
i (x¡i) is an upper bound for the
best reply function of ¯rm i it remains to show that deviations outside the
region L [ M [ R are not pro¯table.
a) We ¯rst analyze deviation upwards, i. e. xi ¸
aT¡x¡i
2 .
For xi ¸ 2x¡i the pro¯t function is given by (13), adjusting, however, the
limits of integration. Analogously to appendix A, part I(c), we have to drop
the last integral if xi ¸
aT¡xi
2 and x¡i · aT
c2:3, drop the last two integrals if
aT
c2:3 · x¡i · aT
2 , and drop the last four integrals if aT
2 · x¡i. That is, region
L divides into three di®erent regions in the case of forward markets.
In all three cases the resulting pro¯t of ¯rm i depends on xi only through
the linear expression ¡kxi, which makes it optimal for ¯rm i to choose the
lowest possible value of xi in each region. Thus, a deviation into the region
where one of the ¯rms is unconstrained at the highest demand realization is
undesirable.
It can also be shown for regions M and R, that ¯rm i never wants
to deviate upwards into that region. However, pro¯t functions look by
far more complicated in regions M and R. The analysis of those cases is
therefore be relegated to the technical supplement that can be found at
http://merlin.fae.ua.es/grimm/grimm-publications.html.
b) Finally we consider a deviation downwards, i. e. xi · x¡i.
If deviation downwards for 0 · x¡i · x
R¡out
¡i should be pro¯table then the
curve given by (25) is an upper bound of ¯rm i's best reply function, which
is su±cient to prove the lemma.
Finally, for x
R¡out
¡i < x¡i it can be veri¯ed that it is never optimal for
¯rm i to choose xi = x¡i . In region IV, which is given by fx 2 R2
+ :
x¡i ¸ xi ¸ 2
c2:3x¡i andx¡i ·
aT¡xi
2 g, the derivative of ¼IV




dxi jxi=x¡i = 450¡11d
100a x2
¡i ¡ 3Tx¡i + aT2
2 ¡ k, which is negative for
x¡i 2 [xR¡out
i ; aT
3 ].27 Similarly it can be veri¯ed that the same holds true
also for x¡i > aT
3 . Thus, we can conclude that for xR¡out
i < x¡i it is never
27Recall that aT
3 is the value of the upper bound of the region where both ¯rms are
constrained at the highest demand realization given xi = x¡i.
36optimal for ¯rm i to choose xi = x¡i.
Part III Now we can show that the best reply function of ¯rm i, xBR
i , is
always below the isoinvestment line INF for all xi ¸ x¡i




as given by (25). Furthermore, we have shown that for x¡i > x
Rout
¡i the best
reply has to be below the 45-degree-line.
In order to show that the upper bound of ¯rm i's best reply,
¹ xBR
i (x¡i;f¤;y¤;d), given by (25) lies below INF, we ¯rst show that the (con-
tinuous) function ¹ xBR
i (x¡i;f¤;y¤;d) is convex in all di®erentiable parts.28
Thus, in order to compare ¹ xBR
i and INF it is su±cient to compare the points
of intersection of ¹ xBR
i and INF with the straight lines that separate the three
regions (see ¯gure 4). We now show that at each intersection point with one
of the separating lines, the sum of investments on the best reply function in
the presence of forward contracts, ¹ xBR
i (x¡i) + x¡i is lower than the sum of
investments on the isoinvestment line.
The four separating lines that have to be checked are (1) x¡i = 0, (2)
xi = 2x¡i, (3) xi =
c2:3x¡i








3 , where the last expression is the total investment in the
market without forward contracts. Along the remaining separating lines, we
now compare the values of x¡i where ¹ xBR
i intersects with each of the three
lines and the intersection points of INF with those lines. We get


















where the last terms are the intersection points of the separating line and





















¡i , and x
R¡out
¡i are
37parameter space k 2 [aT2
c62 ; aT2
2 ], ¾ 2 [0;1], a > 0, and T > 0, which proves
the lemma for k 2 [aT2
c62 ; aT2
2 ]. For k 2 [0; aT2
c62 ] see the supplement than can
be downloaded at http://merlin.fae.ua.es/grimm/grimm-publications.html.
monotone in ¾. Furthermore each inequality can be divided by aT (replacing k = aT 2k0).
Then, inserting the maximizing values of ¾, veri¯cation of conditions (2) to (4) is reduced
to a one variable problem.
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